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 1. Intoduction 
 
For a long time the relation between production of goods and credits allotted to firms was 
analysed at macroeconomic aggregated level (Varga (1937), Trakhtenberg (1939), Mendelson 
(1959-1964), Minsky (1963), Anikine et Entov (1978), Kindleberger (1996), Aglietta et 
Rebérioux (2004)). These studies show that a correlation between them is very strong, but the 
its’ intensity varieties and causal link modifies accordingly to phases of business cycle. More 
recently the analyses were performed at the level of individual firm or at the level of a 
portfolio that shares credit among different firms. For example, Yiu (2004) indicates that the 
investments in risky assets reduce whenever the V@R (maximum expected loss over a given 
horizon period at a given level of confidence in economic growth) constraint becomes 
binding. 
The subject of my analysis is a partially aggregated agent, which represents a group of 
firms homogenous from some judgment about their probability to be bankrupt. Each 
representative firm keeps the signs of multiple attributes of firms that compose its’ group. The 
groups of firms are not formed into some network through cooperation or for some reasons of 
labour division. Such spontaneous emergence of groups (or classes) among the individuals of 
any population, humans or virtual persons, in the realistic context of interests and of 
environmental conditions, is largely analysed in social sciences (for example, Axtell et ali 
(2000), Axtell (2002)). A multitude of latent characteristics that determine the entry of an 
individual into a group explains why such representative agent, being an abstraction, can act 
in response to different stimuli.1 In this work, the classes of firms are constructed using the 
rating of some of their observable and quantifiable qualitative characteristics. The intensity of 
impact of each characteristic into a general one-dimensional rating of a firm reflects an 
importance that researcher attributes to this characteristic in his analysis of phenomenon.  
                                                 
1 Note, that it is not the case for aggregates of national computability. 
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This one-dimensional score represents the temporal quality of firm (in a sense, it’s a 
fundamental for hedonic price). Finally, the researcher reveals into the set of firms’ scores 
some homogenous classes by descretizing the quantitative scores. For that she/he determines 
the thresholds, which disjoin firms in function of their score. 
Now the firms are scored and classified by different institutions and for different reasons 
and purposes. For example, the French agency VIGEO scores 500 000 firms around the world 
accordingly to social criterion of “responsible investment” (Notat (2004)). In this paper the 
classes are created accordingly to default probability of firms. The average values of 
characteristics of firms in each class express the characteristic of representative agent.  
Since, creditor accords credits to firms in function of their score and the performance of a 
firm depends, among other thinks, on condition of financial equilibrium of enterprise, I 
analyse here the credit policy which would avoid the representative firms serial default, 
except some eventual situations, when restructuring is necessary and selective bankruptcy 
must be realised.  
 
 Along these lines, the dynamic of solvency, insolvency and risk transition is analysed. 
New rules are currently introduced in many countries to control the risk taken by the firms; in 
particular, to define the capital required to hedge a risky credit portfolio. It becomes possible 
to analyse the firm default risk and its expected evolution. The agencies report regularly 
summary statistics of the rating histories under the form of transition matrices providing the 
migration probabilities between given rating classes for different years and sectors of 
economic activity. The aim is to verify if the observed migration probabilities can be used as 
leading indicators for business cycles, recession and growth trends in place of other standard 
leading indicators as unemployment or inflation. 
 The bankruptcy principles and the financial regulation are presented in section 2. Then, in 
section 3, the data sets are discussed and some typical evolution of risk probabilities is 
reported. The data of firms’ migration through the classes of risk are often analysed in the 
literature by means of an ordered qualitative model with observable or unobservable factors. 
This model is reviewed in section4, and especially its dynamic properties, when some factors 
represent the cycles. In section 5 the dynamics of up-grade and down-grade migration 
probabilities data are compared with the evolution of the GNP. Some results of causality 
analysis of links between risk of default and some financial variables are described. Finally, in 
section 6 examples of control methodology are agreed. The goal of the control is the selection 
of a policy for avoiding systemic risk. 
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 2. The bankruptcy laws  and the financial regulation 
 
Operating firm must be solvent. According to accounting principles it signifies that it can 
serve and refund all its debt’s becoming due. Insolvency is the situation when the firm’s debt 
is greater than its asset value including: stocks, accorded credits, real estates, machines and 
other assets. In a situation of insolvency bankruptcy occurs. It is the pattern for resolving 
disbursement problems of firm owners.  
Moreover, bankruptcy, as an institution of regulation, implicates some general economic 
issues of capitalism such as the production of wealth (analysing by whom the wealth has been 
produced, in conformity with which objectives) and the outcome sharing. For example, the 
bankruptcy regulation is needed in Russia since the economic liberalisation and the massive 
privatisation in 1992. Before, the unique owner - the State - was not faced with the problem of 
firms’ insolvency, because he valorised them throughout the criteria of national usefulness 
and the mechanism of equalization of assets among firms. The restructuring, moving or 
dismantling occurred without unemployment and without revenue losses for individuals (I 
will not discuss the overall economic efficiency of Soviet mechanism of reproduction and 
accumulation.)  
 Historically, bankruptcy consists in three stages:  
1) to withdraw publicly the bankrupt from operating;  
2) to gather all information about creditors and to estimate assets;  
3) to settle the investors' failure (they lose for this reason their property rights), to sale assets 
in order to indemnify the creditors, to quash the marginal debts and to arrange the firm's 
liquidation.  
 The entrepreneur observing insolvency can seek at short run to realise some very risky 
activity. Therefore bankruptcy legislation traditionally (since 17 century) seeks to regulate the 
enter/exit rules of operating in order to protect the public interest (or total efficiency) from 
excessively risky firms.  
 
 For several reasons firms face debts, and are unable to repay them in some circumstances. The 
bankruptcy procedure is required to explain and to resolve the problems rising in such situations. The 
most important goals of the bankruptcy can be enumerated: It should provide a not wasteful outcome 
that is the maximal sum available to be shared between debtors, creditors and other concerned 
participants, such us, employees. It should preserve the bonding role of debt by penalising the 
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managers and shareholders according their faults. The bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy states must be 
treated with similar attention concerning the contractual obligations within the firm.  
 Two principal forms of bankruptcy procedures exist: an asset sale and a structural bargaining. The 
sale of the firm’s assets is usually supervised by a trustee, or a receiver. Such procedures and 
supervision are not as evident as it seems from the old capitalist world. For example, the Russian 
government postponed decisions of restructuring the industrial sector after the privatisations in earlier 
1990. It did not force insolvent firms into bankruptcy, even when it was their largest creditor. The 
government, particularly at the regional level, often interferes in bankruptcy proceedings to prevent 
job-losses. After all, the lack of a credible threat of bankruptcy has meant that managers did not seek 
to avoid insolvency. As a result the country was facing an increase of firm insolvency with a huge 
accumulation of unpaid debts. Recognising that large-scale initiation of legal proceedings of 
bankruptcy as asset sale is impossible; one seeks other means and ways. 
 In the case of structured bargaining the claimants are encouraged to bargain about the future of the 
firm. Indeed it can be liquidated or restructured, and in both cases the rules should be negotiated and 
determined. For example, the bankruptcy law in France give to the court, through an administrator, the 
power to accept a restructuring plan without the approval of creditors (or workers) if it guarantees the 
maintenance of employment and the repayments of creditors.  
 Some problems arise in connection with structured bargaining procedure, since it follows two 
objectives at the same time that are: the task to decide for the firm future and who should get what in 
the event of a restructuring of claims. The bankruptcy reforms are in progress in many countries in 
order to make the procedures more transparent and efficient (see Hart, 1999). Thus, the goal of an 
appropriate bankruptcy law is to reduce the systemic risk and overall financial instability. But the 
regulation of financial system, with the prudential rules is another way. 
 Bankruptcy of an individual financial institution or micro-prudential accident is a consequence of 
disruption of one or more indicators of the institution’s health, such as: capital adequacy, asset quality, 
management soundness, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to risk. The widespread financial distress 
may come from the failure of individual institutions and the spread trough different contagion 
mechanisms to the financial system in general (Gourieroux & Peaucelle (1996)). The objective of a 
macro-prudential approach to regulation is to limit the risk of financial distress with its significant 
losses in terms of GDP. The strengthening of the macro-prudential mechanism needs a closer 
cooperation between supervisory authorities and central banks, that why new rules of macro-prudential 
regulation have been elaborated by Basle Capital Accord. 
 
 3. Available data for default analysis  
 
The objective of the New Basle Capital Accord II (2003-2004) is to allow banks to manage their 
risks with a dynamic approach of capital adequacy. The first internationally accepted standard was 
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developed in 1988. These and following rules are introduced by the regulator (Central bank governors 
and the heads of bank supervisory authorities in the Group of Ten countries G10) to control the risk, in 
particular to define the capital required to hedge a risky credit portfolio [the so-called Value-at-Risk 
(V@R) that is the maximum expected loss over a given horizon period at a given level of confidence]. 
The implementation of this regulation requires a careful analysis of firm default risk and of its 
expected evolution. As a by product the rating agencies as Standard & Poor's (S&P), Moody's, Fitch, 
or some central banks, as the Banque de France (BdF), have been led to improve the quality of their 
proprietary rating data bases2. Typically, they make public summary statistics of the rating histories 
under the form of transition matrices providing the migration probabilities between given rating 
classes for different years and economic sectors. These statistics are the dynamic measure of degrees 
of creditworthiness among operating firms.  
 
The definition of the rating and the population of firms differ according to the rating agencies. 
 
 For instance the main rating agencies obtain information about the situation of the firms, generally 
when they are issuing bonds. This explains why their data bases concern large firms, mainly US 
companies, even if the proportion of European and Japanese firms represented in the bases has grown 
rapidly at the end of the eighties. The number of rated firms is around 10 000, with a proportion of 
missing data (alternative NR : not rated) between 10 and 20 %. These data are reliable since 1985 
approximately, providing 17 years of observed transitions matrices. They use a rating with ten classes 
from the highest rating [AAA for S&P for instance] to the worst one D corresponding to default. 
 
 The data collected by the French Central Bank are of another type. They include the balance sheets 
of French firms, with sales larger than 762 000 Euros , or those with debts 5 times beyond the threshold 
of registration at Central of banking risks (the threshold since 1997 is 76 224 Euros). Consequently, 
the data are covering about 185 000 firms per year, 85% of workforces and 90% of distributed bank 
credits. In the French Central Bank case, the contribution of economic ratios on financial situation of a 
firm depends on the sector. For example, for Industry there are eight economic ratios that contribute to 
the score value. The score indicates the health of firms in report with the management ratios, such as: 
provider deadline, tax and social security creditor; rate of return and return on sales: rate of added 
value; solvency: burden of financial charges; debt: leasing liabilities, capital-debt ratio; and current 
liabilities: liquidity, bad or doubtful debt. Then the information included in the balance sheet is 
transformed into a quantitative score representing the risk level of defaulting.3. After that the score is 
discretized to get a qualitative rating with ten classes of risk (average probability of default at the 
                                                 
2 See e.g. Brady et alii (2003) for a description of S&P data base, Carty (1997) for the Moody's data 
base, Foulcher et alii (2003), Bardos (2004), for a description of the Banque de France data base. 
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horizon of three years), noted D, 1, ..., 10. The alternative "D" corresponds to default  and the 
alternative "10" indicates a perfect financial situation (analogue of the AAA of the rating agencies). 
The default in the French Central Bank rating signifies that the enterprise is under bankruptcy 
procedure. For example, in 2001 among industrial firms in France 20.4% of firms had a high 
probability of default in the future, 8.4% of firms were neutral, and 71.2% were healthy firms. The risk 
of default changes in time, and the score of any firm can maintain it in the same class of risk or switch 
into another class. The structure of migrations among the classes allows us to analyse the risk 
dynamics. In France the data have been collected since 1992, which provides 11 years of transition 
matrices. 
 
Example of transition matrix reported by the Banque de France is given in the table  below. 
Table 1. Migration probabilities “Industry”, between 1999 and 2000 (in %) 
 
 
 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 D NS 
10 72,38 15,91 1,34 1,51 0,46 0,17 0,41 0,24 0,05 0 0,05 7,49 
9 12,47 57,58 13,56 5,75 0,92 0,59 0,72 0,98 0,1 0,06 0,09 7,17 
8 1,28 26,67 35,74 23,35 1,77 0,66 1,12 2,04 0,43 0,05 0,17 6,72 
7 0,39 4,88 16,16 50,57 8,71 2,94 2,13 4,21 1,21 0,54 0,48 7,79 
6 0,26 1,9 3,01 33,61 23,3 10 6,96 6,76 2,24 1,42 1,45 9,09 
5 0,26 1,94 2,51 17,21 20,92 16,16 14,07 9,94 3,71 1,94 1,78 9,57 
4 0,25 2,04 3,05 12,98 12,53 12,83 17,52 14,56 4,68 4,18 2,85 12,53 
3 0,08 1,62 3,05 13,64 9,3 5,89 11,61 21,11 7,11 6,21 4,34 16,04 
2 0,11 0,78 1,56 8,16 8,6 5,81 10,61 16,54 12,74 9,5 7,37 18,21 
1 0 0,24 0,82 2,83 4,59 3,53 6,48 12,96 8,48 24,5 15,31 20,26 
 
 
A lot of migration probabilities are rather small. The significant values are mainly around the main 
diagonals, which represents the proportions of firms keeping their previous rating class (the class of 
default probability) , and for default as arrival state (absorbing state). These matrices can be 
summarized by considering the probabilities of a down-grade [resp. an up-grade]. For instance for a 
firm rated “6” at the beginning of the year, the probability of an up-grade is the probability to migrate 
to one of the state 7,8,9 or 10.4. 
In order to analyse the systemic default risk, it is important to consider the simultaneous rating 
migrations of firms with different indicators of risk in the same direction. Such migration is called 
migration correlation. The stochastic transition matrix, which assumes a common multivariate factor 
across firms, represents the migration correlation between different classes of risk.  
                                                                                                                                                        
3 For example, in the article by Bardos & ali (2004) the risk level of default is revealed by a 
discriminant analysis technique.  
4 As usual, in empirical studies it is important here to be careful with interpretation of estimation 
results. For example, the study of Moody’s ratings of U.S. corporates shows that the number of down-
grades in corporate bond has exceeded the number of up-grades, leading to think that the credit quality 
of U.S. corporate debt has declined. The article by Blume and alii (1998) suggests however that a 
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4. Analysis of default dynamic: the ordered qualitative model with factor 
 
The ordered qualitative model with factor is usually considered in the literature (see e.g. Albanese, 
Chen (2003), Bangia et alii (2002), Gupton et alii (1997), Crouhy et alii (2000)) as a convenient 
specification for stochastic transition matrices. Indeed it allows reducing the number of factors, which 
are driving the different migration probabilities, while keeping the model tractable with a reasonable 
number of parameters. 
As usual the specification is based on a latent variable Si,t, , which can be interpreted as an 
underlying quantitative score, directly related to an expected probability of default at some horizon. 
Typically the horizon is 3 years for the BdF score. Thus Si,t is the value of the score for firm i at date t. 
It is assumed that the conditional distribution of variable Si,t given the information available at the 
beginning of period t depends on some factor Zt and on the most recent rating Yi,t–l. It is such that: 
 
Latent model for the score 
 
Si,t = ak + bk Zt + sk ui,t, 
(1) 
if Yi,t-l = k,    k = 0, ..., K – 1, 
where ak, bk, sk are scalar parameters and ui,t are independent error terms, identically distributed with 
common distribution function G. Thus three parameters are introduced for each rating class: ak 
measures a level effect, bk is the risk sensitivity with respect to the factor5, whereas sk is the 
idiosyncratic (firm specific) standard error. 
 
Latent model for the factor 
 
The factor has to be assumed non observable, to allow for migration correlation [see the discussion 
in Gagliardini, Gourieroux (2003)]. Loosely speaking, if the different sensitivity coefficients are 
nonnegative, a positive movement on Zt will imply a joint increase of the individual risks whatever the 
rating class of the ferms. Thus we will get a positive migration or up-grade correlation, if the future of 
the factor is not a priori known. It will be assumed that the evolution of the factor is independent of the 
values of the shocks ui,t, that they depend on the past by means of the most recent factor value (which 
is the Markov assumption), and that the transition factor density can be parameterized. This density 
                                                                                                                                                        
major part of down-grades trend in ratings is the result of changing standards of scoring and rating by 
this agency 
5 We have implicitly consided a one factor model for expository purpose. 
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will be denoted by: 
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for small dz. 
 
Link between latent and observable variables 
 
Finally the rating of period t is defined by discretizing the quantitative score: 
 
 Yi,t = l, if and only if al < Sit < al+l,  (3) 
 
where: a0 = – ¥ < al < ...< aK-1 < aK = + ¥ are fixed (unknown) thresholds. 
 
Under the specification above it is easy to derive the migration probabilities given the factor value. 
Since the factor is indexed by time only, these quantities are closed to the observed sample transition 
matrices, computed per year. We get: 
 
pk,l,t  = P [Yi,t = l|Yi,t–1 = k , Zt] 
 
= P [al < Si,t < al+1| Yi,t–1 = k , Zt] 
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The model reduces to an ordered probit model with factor, if the common distribution G 
corresponds to the standard  Gaussian distribution, and to a Cox model with stochastic intensity  if  
exp ui,t follows an exponential distribution [see e.g. Lando (1998)]. The beta model assumes 
independent transition matrices, with independent rows, following beta distribution (the beta 
distribution is the basic specification used in probability and statistics for the law of a stochastic 
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discrete distribution). 
 
Different specifications of the factor dynamics can be retained in practice. Feng et alii (2003) 
assume a Gaussian vector autoregressive factor. When business cycle is specified by means of a 
hidden Markov chain , it seems natural to consider a factor with discrete state space {0, 1}, where "0" 
represents "recession" and "1" represents "expansion". The factor dynamics is summarized in this case 
by a (2,2) transitions matrix ÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
=
11
01
10 p
p
p
p
P oo . For this model the joint process (Y1t, ..., Ynt, Zt) defines a 
Markov chain, with some recursivity in the joint transition matrix (Gagliardini-Gourieroux (2003)). 
 
 5. Credit migration and economic growth 
 
The relationship between firm default and general economic dynamic has been advocated since a 
long time in the economic literature. During a recession period, the firms have more difficulty to sell 
their productions, which can deteriorate their balance sheet, their probability of failure increases, as 
well as the credit rate, offered by their lender. Conversely, if the probability of failure of a firm 
increases, it has more difficulty to find credit at a small rate, which can increase the amount of regular 
reimbursement and reacts negatively on its situation. This creates an accelerated movement towards 
default, with the usual consequences on employment, growth, deflation… The new existing databases 
on credit histories allow for a better understanding of the relationship between the business cycle and 
the factors influencing credit risk and credit migration. A few number of studies have already been 
done on this topic [see Nickell, Perraudin, Varotto (2000), Bangia et alii (2002)], and especially with 
proxies of the business cycle , such as the NBER indicator. They essentially concern the US business 
cycle at a general level, and do not take into account the effect specific of a sector structure of 
economy. Gagliardini and Gourieroux (2004), Boussyguine and Peaucelle (2004) analyse the French 
rate of GDP evolution, and its impact on risk migration in some sectors of French economy. 
 
The evaluation of migration probabilities of firms in France shows clearly some common feature, 
with at most two underlying patterns : 1) the evolutions for up-grade are in the inverse directions of the 
evolutions for down-grade, the up-grades have an ascending trend in each class of risk on the period 
between 1992-2001, and the down-grades feature has inverse declining general trend (except the class 
1 of high default risk); 2) the evolutions for three sectors (industry, wholesale and retail trade) are very 
similar. This pattern is compared with the French growth rate, and the comparison shows the strong 
link between migration probabilities and growth rate. The dynamic linear link between the down-grade 
series and the GDP, using a causality analysis, indicates for analysed sectors that, on one hand, for the 
classes of low risk the GDP is a leading indicator of the down-grade risk migration, but on other hand, 
the ordering between both measures is reversed in the very risky classes, where the down-grade 
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probabilities can be considered as leading indicator of the economic growth with a lead of two and 
three years. Besides, the down-grade tendency is more reactive than the up-grade one to GNP 
modification.  
Such are recent empirical investigations concerning the dynamic analysis of default risk in some 
sectors of French economy and of economic growth of this country. 
 
The firms’ scoring determines the class of risk to which it belongs and consequently the condition 
of credit (amount and term) it can count on. In any case the “health” of operating firm depends on 
quality of credit it gets. 
In Boussyguine and Peaucelle (2004) the causal relation between the trends of upgrade and 
downgrade in French industrial sector and the spread evolution, as well as with evolution of treasury 
bonds are analysed. It is shown that the rate of bonds remuneration is an advanced indicator for 
downgrade movement in one risky class (2 class) and in no risky classes (6,7,8,9). It is also leading 
indicator for upgrade movement in relatively neutral to risk classes (4,5,6 and 7). The causal impact of 
spread is observed only for two classes of risk (5 and 7) and it is statistically significant for upgrade 
trend as well as for downgrades. 
 
6. Risk management or economic growth control 
 
Some interesting works have been done recently in the domain of risk management and control. 
The majority concern idiosyncratic shocks that provoke the defaults. In such case the optimisation 
programme has to solve either the creditor problem, or the borrower portfolio problem looking for the 
optimal allocation of investment between liquidity, stocks or credit subject to an exogenously 
specified V@R control condition. In the recent article by Yiu (2004) the V@R is imposed as a 
dynamic constraint in the optimisation of portfolios problem. Thus, at each period the V@R is 
estimated and it has an effect on the investment decision. The author finds that in such model the 
investments in risky assets are reduced whenever the V@R constraint becomes binding. Besides, when 
V@R is the risk control, consumption and expected utilit y are not considerably affected for certain 
choices of parameters. This result confirms more general statement that system safety could not be a 
very strong constraint and certainly not the goal. Indeed, any system with some degree of probability 
at some instant reaches the attractive position of “catastrophe”, like bankruptcy in the case of financial 
institution. If one hypothesises that safety is the aim of an operating system than the solution is 
obvious and consists in breaking off the system. If an existing system is considered as useful, than the 
problem of its safety must be analysed in the context of some incentives to operate it.  
My fields of interest are the investigation in the systemic risk prevention and the adaptive control 
of interconnections that exist between business cycle and heterogeneous risk aversion of the firms. In 
particular I want to consider the stabilisation of complex chaotic systems through feedback 
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management. The aim is not to come across the most effective means to achieve the goal, but rather to 
explore the principal possibilities of its’ achievement and to analyse the class of potential movements 
of the system under control. For example, the migration matrices characterise the “health” of financial 
and real economy (as a system), and they can be used to feedback impulses (regulation) on it. The 
regulation consists in credit policy addressed to firms regarding the general rate of economic growth. 
In general the realistic model of complex system cannot be solved analytically, and researchers 
combine simulation with optimisation tools for control and optimal design. Typically our problem of 
interest leads to complex optimisation problems whose criterion function admits no analytically 
tractable form. In such cases the estimation of the values of criterion function by simulation and the 
search for an optimal solution by genetic algorithms (Köchel & Peaucelle (2003)) or evolution 
strategies can be performed. 
 
Instead of conclusion, I prefer to describe the methodological scheme for future development of 
control analysis (prescriptive proposal) of the dynamic relation between risk evolutions and economic 
growth using the results of empirical investigations (descriptive proposal) reported in previous 
sections6.  
To formulate a control problem signify to design an interested subject, who has some concerns vis-
à-vis the system, and such subject may be Basle Capital Accord of G10 or Central Bank, called CB. 
The object of concern can be systemic risk avoiding (prevention of generalised down-grading) and 
sustain ing of economic growth. Such aim is interesting to study since till now one frequent criticism of 
the current Basel Capital Adequacy frame (determining the following risk components: default 
probability, loss given default, exposure at default, effective maturity) is that it increases procyclicity 
with a negative consequence on firm’s operating.  
Then it is necessary to describe the relationships between CB and the object that is the structure of 
interests, the dynamic properties of the object (revealed for the moment for three sectors of French 
firms by empirical analysis), and the possibilities and methods of concerns’ achievement. The problem 
can be formalised by introducing a system of axioms that circumscribes a class of utility-oriented 
systems, which have the unique subject, CB, of concerns, but this subject has the concerns of multi-
perspective types. The object of interests is passive 7, dynamic and stochastic system. Its structure is 
not determined precisely and the decision maker, CB, can construct it. The control aim is not 
postulated a priori, and the control motivation is in relation with the set of concerns (interests).  
It is postulated that dynamic is described through a Markovian process. Three types of interests are 
provided concerning: a) the control of system evolution, b) the choice of its structure, c) the diagnosis 
                                                 
6 I acknowledge V. Baranov (2004) who suggested me to consider the problem in this way. 
7 Regulator admits the hypothesis of passivity of migration matrix, but the researcher has to remember 
that each matrix is an aggregation of operating firms and an abstract of decision making of thousands 
of firms. 
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of situations , in which the process of interests’ realisation can be situated. The axioms are used to 
formulate the premises of decision making oriented to control the process of interests achievement in 
the course of operating and avoiding the systemic default.  
The premises of decision making are the following: 
1. The unplanned evolution of the states of the elements of risk migration matrix (object of 
concerns) is described by a Markovian process. The set of states S encloses the attractor D 
(default). ß(S) is an a priori distribution of probabilities on the set S.  
2. X is a finite set of situations. The situations require diagnosis, which consists in the 
selection of situation in function of the state. Let XsÍX the constraints, which determine the 
acceptance of situations as alternatives for diagnosis, depending on the stats sÎS. 
3. Let C a set of control signals, which are chosen depending on situation xÎX. The constraints 
CxÍC are given concerning the acceptance of control alternatives in function on situation 
xÎX. The set C contains the control signals which pull the system out of attractor state D. In 
our problem, on one side, the new entries in different classes of risk, for example in share 
proportional to the population of each class, can be interpreted as such signals , on other 
side, spreads are usual price signals in controlling economic systems. 
4. The structure of the object is not fixed and can be “selected” among the structural 
alternatives G (since a residual heterogeneity exists in any class of risk, see equation (1)). 
The structural alternative is selected dependently on states and situations (scoring and 
rating); and especially on their common parameter (factor Zt). If structural alternative is 
chosen consequently in any moment it is called tactical option, if it is constant at all horizon 
of interests existence it is called strategic option. 
5. The utilisation of control impulses generates a discrete Markovian control process with 
values belonging to the set S of states. The transition function of this process is given by: 
qg(SçS´C), where parameter gÎG is a structural alternative.  
6. Then it is necessary to introduce the utility function wg(C´S´X) ®Â1, which determines the 
a priori preferences on the set of alternatives control signals C, where c’>c Û 
wg(c’,s,x)>wg(c,s,x). (For example, supervisory review of banks’ internal assessments of 
their overall risks must ensure that bank management is exercising good judgement of 
situation for crediting). 
7. The control is performed according to the scheme of situational control: at discrete 
moments one observes the state, depending on this state a diagnosis of situation is selected, 
and accordingly to the result of diagnosis one makes a decision about the control impulses.  
 
 The postulates of decision making (1-7) determine the bearer of information a priori about the 
condition of decision making, generating the “information structure” of basic data a priori: 
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 I={S, ß(S),X, [XsÍX, sÎS],C, [CxÍC, xÎX],G, qg(S/S´C), wg(C´S´X), gÎG}. 
 
 Accordingly to the information structure I, one develops the methodology of control formalisation 
based on the principles of: a) splitting of concerns (interests), b) equilibrium solutions, c) structural 
transformation. The following methodological positions describe the content of these principles: 
 1. The multi-perspective concerns are decomposed into some components. Each aspect is 
confronted to “virtual concerned segment” (class of risk) and corresponding set of alternatives. It is 
supposed that for each segment one criterion of quality among alternatives can be determined; at the 
same time criterions are independent, but not given a priori explicitly.  
2. Each segment (firms of each class of risk) has the possibility to make a choice individually, but 
it is constrained by the necessity to respect the common interests of the subject, CB. Because of 
constrains the interests of different segments are consistent under these conditions, more, they are of 
cooperative type. 
3. The problem has game theory content with latent cooperative concerns (interests). 
4. The solution of the problem consists in researching of a stable compromise which cannot be 
improved. Such compromise is a cooperatively efficient equilibrium. 
5. The criterions of alternatives’ quality of virtual segments must be elaborated using the structural 
transformations of initial information structure I, into the necessary information structure. 
 
The model of decision making describes:  
- the initial hypotheses;  
- the strategies of: control, diagnosis and structural choice;  
- the criterions of: strategic control quality, structural choice quality, and quality of strategic 
diagnosis, which can be an average “risk”; 
- the dynamic equilibriums. 
Than, it is necessary to explain the way to achieve the dynamic equilibrium: the necessary and 
sufficient conditions, as well as local equilibriums. The model of dynamic equilibriums presupposes 
that they are asymptotically stationary, and for this the estimates of closeness (operator of 
compression) to stationary equilibrium have to be demonstrated.  
The computational construction of dynamic equilibrium by V.Baranov (2004) consists in the 
algorithm of dynamic equilibrium approximation and in the algorithm of local equilibrium. The last 
one needs the formulation of information structures concerning the “utility” and the “risk”. Finally, the 
algorithms of configuration of information structures respectively for “utility” and for “risk” are 
described.  
 
The procedures presented previously provide a dynamic apparatus of decision making in 
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organisational operating systems with the assignment to conserve their safety and soundness, 
consolidate the stability of the financial system, and improve its ability to serve as a source for 
sustainable growth for economy.  
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